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Eyal Bar is a junior
at the University of Florida majoring in political science with a minor
in philosophy. He is a native of Israel and shares special interest in
the topic of a Middle East peace.
In May of 2004, Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon split with his fellow Likud party members and
called for a unilateral withdrawal from the Palestinian territory of
Gaza. This withdrawal would include the uprooting of Jewish settlements
which extend into the territories. All twenty-one Gaza settlements, along
with four settlements in the Northern West Bank, as well as Israeli
utility and industrial zones in these areas would undergo a process of
transferring ownership to Palestinians.
What led Sharon to make such a daring political maneuver? Why would he
risk the breakup of his coalition government?
To understand the significance of this decision, a quick review of
recent Israeli politics is necessary.
The topic of Israeli settlements has long been a detour on the
Road Map to peace between Israelis and Palestinians. The future of these
settlements as well as that of Jerusalem have long been deal breakers,
causing the failure of the Wye River Accords between Benjamin Netanyahu
and Yasser Arafat in 1998, as well as the second Wye River agreement
between Ehud Barak and Arafat in September of 1999. After over a year of
stagnation, a second Intifada broke out in September of 2000, spreading
violence across Israel. Suicide bus bombings, attacks on military
checkpoints, destructive targeted assassinations, and the demolition of
Palestinian Authority chairman Yasser Arafat’s compound were all
results of this new wave of violence. The hopes for a peaceful resolution to
a long, drawn out peace process seemed to dwindle. Israel’s treatment of Yasser
Arafat changed from a partner in negotiations to a terrorist. And in May of 2004, Ariel Sharon upset
the status quo of Israeli politics by announcing plans to unilaterally
withdraw and dismantle all Gaza settlements by September of 2005.
The contemporary nature of this subject places certain
restrictions on the information available, as details continue to be
molded by daily events. The explanation that follows relies heavily on both
news reports and historical analysis. Information regarding the intent of
leaders involved in the process is not readily available, as political
bargaining will continue at least until the goal date of September 2005
set forth in the Road Map. Thus, the
trends in policy will be helpful to outline intent and logic of policy
change.
To understand such a change in Israeli foreign policy, one must
consider the known and expected outcomes from unilateral withdrawal, and
then understand the decision making process. Because multiple causes are
probable; be they international pressures, economic calculations, or
security reassessments, the most telling causes will come from areas
which have experienced significant change.
According to the realist school of thought, states make decisions
based on rational calculations through cost-benefit analysis, and choose
to maximize their power. Israeli policy makers would therefore be
expected also to maximize their benefits and reduce their costs.
Furthermore, realists give little credit to identity as an indicator of
state behavior, instead focusing on the strength and security of the
state in policy calculations.
Neo-realists on the other hand give more credit to identity, as
well as to the international structure and its influence on a
state’s calculations. Neo-realists also contend that the
maximization of power is not the dominant motive of decision makers;
instead, states formulate policy in order to maximize its security. Security may include many factors such as
economy and deterrent strength.
Identity may also be intertwined with security, such as
Egypt’s foreign policy of Pan-Arabism under Nasser.
Although international pressures are relevant to the study of this
question, as are the personal actors involved, the focus of this paper
will be on Israeli domestic politics as an explanation of the reasons,
possibility, and barriers to unilateral withdrawal. Two factors seem to
stand out most in an explanation of the Israeli peace process. Security
considerations are crucial to decision makers, but it is the politics of
identity which reveal the nature and history of the conflict. These two
topics combine to make the disengagement plan a difficult political
maneuver.
The Israeli identity complex, but most Israelis identify with
their Jewish heritage. Their goal
is to maintain a Jewish state in Israel.
This movement, called Zionism, began in the early 1900’s and
gained momentum after the Holocaust.
After World War II, Zionists pointed to their persecution throughout
history as justification for the existence of a Jewish state in order to
maintain a healthy Jewish culture.
But as Shibley Telhami explains, the Zionist movement is split among two
differing versions, “one envisioning Israel less as an ideological and
religious entity and more a home for Jewish nationalism in a world of
nationalism, the other a more territorially expansionist, ideologically
ambitious vision.”
These differences weigh heavily on the settlement policies which have
been implemented throughout history. Leftist parties such as the Labor
party have been more willing to make concessions as a part of the peace
process; while more conservative parties such as Likud have taken a more
hard-line approach, demanding concessions on the Palestinian side before
engaging in progressive action. A
small number of ultra orthodox Jews believe the land of Israel should not
belong to the Jewish people or be established for the messiah has not yet
arrived. Because this view is held
by such a small number of Israelis it is of little importance to decision
makers. Most Israelis view Israel
as home to a Jewish state.
So in 1990 when they argued for the transfer of Israeli
territories to the Palestinians, Labor party officials appealed to the
Jewish identity of Israel by suggesting it was at stake if Israelis
continued to exercise power over the territories. They argued that the
situation was a “ticking demographic bomb” in which the
Israeli majority faced the threat of a growing Palestinian population,
and ultimately a Palestinian majority.
To deal with this threat, the Israeli government considered several
options, the first of which was transferring Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza to other locations. While this option would perhaps ease
security concerns and answer the demographic question, it was disregarded
because of an anticipated international backlash for human rights
violations. The next option,
considered by the Likud Prime Minister Yitzak Shamir, was to create
conditions inside the territories that would render life unbearable,
forcing Palestinians to leave by their own accord. By making economic and
political conditions harsh, Shamir thought the Palestinians would
evacuate; however, this too was not a realistic option and was abandoned
as well. The immigration of many Russian Jews into Israel after the fall
of the Soviet Union alleviated some population concerns. In addition to the Russian immigration,
Likud supported the expansion of Jewish settlements in the Palestinian
territories, making resolution to the settlement question less likely
than before. While these steps assured that the Palestinians would not
gain a majority and thus control over Israel, they did not address
security concerns. Israel would not reassess the settlements until after
the outbreak of the Second Intifada.
In the late 1980’s, up to forty percent of Israelis rejected
the plan of Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank; a decade
later, that number dropped to only ten to fifteen percent. The Israeli
public is now divided into three groups: the few “ideological
hawks” that reject any concession of the lands of Greater Israel,
the “security hawks”, who belong largely to the Likud and
other conservative parties, and the “security doves”,
including Labor and other leftist parties. Security “doves”
and “hawks” are divided over the issue of whether or not an
independent Palestinian state would alleviate security concerns, or
increase the risk of conflict with a more organized and legitimate Palestinian
state. The Likud party has historically been resistant to the idea,
demanding that first noticeable changes in the Palestinian Authority must
take place. To begin with attempts to illicit changes were made
diplomatically, but in 2002, Israel resorted to force with targeted
assassinations and the destruction of Palestinian Authority leader Yasser
Arafat’s compound. Given recent history, Ariel Sharon would be an
unlikely candidate to push for a unilateral withdrawal from the
territories. Many in
Sharon’s own party have begun to question his leadership. If Sharon
belongs to the party of minimal concessions, why had he called for a
pullout? If Israeli identity had not drastically changed, and given the
dismay of his fellow Likud members, other factors need to be explored in order
to explain this policy.
After the government approved Sharon’s disengagement plan,
he explained that the plan “would contribute to [Israeli] security,
its political standing, its economy, and to the demographics of the
Jewish people in the land of Israel.”
But as early as 1995, secret negotiations took place between Labor leader
Shimon Peres’ government and Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian
Authority expressed the eventual need for a two-state solution.
Realizing that a sovereign Palestinian state meant increased security for
Israel, as well as a reduction in economic burdens caused by the
territories, and a positive message to the international community; the
Labor party ran on a platform which supported an eventual two-state
solution. However, as Benjamin Netanyahu won the 1996 elections, and took
a hard-line approach to the Palestinian issue, expanding settlements both
in and around Palestinian occupied East Jerusalem. The violence resulting
from occupation of the Palestinian territories was not new, the
settlements caused economic burdens, and Israelis understood the
“demographic time bomb” as explained earlier. So if Sharon
strictly followed Israel’s interest in security, he would have
called for disengagement earlier.
What new factors allowed for such a move?
A change in Israeli ideology is also insufficient in explaining
the shift in Israeli policy. After the start of the second Intifada,
Sharon ran on a platform which promised a tougher approach to the
Palestinian problem. Sharon assured the Israeli public that if elected,
no concessions would be made to the Palestinians unless they took the
initiative to end terrorism. When
the Palestinian Authority did not take decisive action to curb terrorist
acts, Sharon began running military operations within the territories,
installing checkpoints on the borders and within, and constructing a
security wall around the West Bank. When the unilateral withdrawal was
declared, Israel had no partner on the Palestinian side with which to
negotiate. The Israeli public elected Sharon on the assumption he could
make no concession with the Palestinians first. If Sharon did not receive any clues
from the public that it was ready to concede. What explains this change? The Israeli policy was reshaped from
above.
When questioned about his
disengagement plan, Sharon has several times cited pressure from the
United States to move the peace process forward. Letters between Prime
Minister Sharon and President Bush show a mutual understanding of the
process toward peace. Both stress the need for a two-state solution, with
concessions being made by both Palestinians and Israelis, as explained by
the roadmap to peace presented by the Bush administration.
America has played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process from
the beginning, arranging diplomatic talks with Israel and Egypt which led
to an eventual peace agreement. They have also played a significant role
in the Palestinian peace process, inviting both sides Camp David as well
as at the Wye Conference. Still it is hard to conclude that
Sharon’s motives are driven by American pressures. These pressures
were in place throughout the Clinton and Bush administrations, yet
Sharon’s policy shift was only revealed in May of 2004. The war in
Iraq may help explain an increased pressure from America on Israel as a
result of the U. S. need to foster better Arab relations. Saddam Hussein often referred to the
Palestinian cause, expressing its importance and significance to the
struggle of all Arabs.
In March of 1993, a group of
Israeli and Palestinian officials were brought together at the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences meeting in Rome. At this meeting, the topic
of a unilateral withdrawal was discussed and endorsed as a viable option
to end attacks mounted against Israel by the Labor Party. The PLO agreed
to the idea of a “Gaza first” approach to withdrawal, on the
conditions that they would retain the power of the evacuated areas, and
that this would not be a “Gaza only” approach. But now with
the Palestinian Authority in disorder, it would appear that the
bargaining position of the Palestinians is harmed. The Palestinians have
less power to ensure that Sharon is not engaging in a “Gaza
only” approach, though his concessions in the northern region of the
West Bank may be proof this is not his intention. The disengagement plan
still requires parliamentary approval before each of its four steps,
allowing future events to continue to shape the outcome.
If Palestinian elections are successful, and a new leader emerges who is
viewed as legitimate to both the Palestinian and Israelis, the bargaining
power of the Palestinians should increase, allowing the question of the
West Bank disengagement to be settled. If, however, the Palestinians fail
to find a leader who is considered legitimate by both sides,
Sharon’s plan may in fact amount to a “Gaza only”
concession, necessarily leading to a continuation of the struggle toward
peace.
The last factor which may have
influenced Sharon’s policy is the domestic political environment.
When the disengagement plan was announced, the government was in danger
of collapse due to lack of support for Sharon. Through political
bargaining and a restructuring of the government, Sharon was able to
maintain a coalition. By including the Labor party in the new government,
Sharon was assured that he would have a vast base of support for the
disengagement. This move also allowed Sharon to appease his mostly
rightwing constituency, by shoring up support for his new budget. The
Labor party expressed its support for the disengagement, claiming that
its importance was enough to agree to Sharon’s budget, even if it
was an anti-social one. Labor was
not hesitant to negotiate an increased allotment for social programs in
the budget, understanding Sharon needed their support in order to
accomplish its objectives. Without this arrangement within the
government, Sharon’s plan would remain unrealistic and would have
little hope of success in the parliament.
There has been no significant change
in the Israeli identity and interests which one would expect when
explaining the decision to unilaterally withdraw from the Palestinian
territories. Instead, the domestic
political structure and international pressures played a large role in
the realization of this new policy.
The status of Israeli politics made it necessary for Sharon to
arrange a coalition which required the support of the Labor and other
liberal parties in order to pass a conservative budget. Sharon garnered their support for an
anti-social budget by compromising on Israeli settlements. The American influence also affected
Sharon’s decisions, especially given its current dilemma in the
Middle East and a tarnished image in the international community. Understanding the domestic political
structure allows for an explanation of this change in settlement policy,
which was outside the scope of other theories of international
relations.
Works Cited
[1]
Haaretz Online Newspaper, “Four-stage disengagement
plan”, May 28,
2004. http://www.haaretz.com. Accessed on December 8, 2004.
2 Reuters,
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Crisis in the Middle East,
12-13. (Upper
Saddle River:
Prentice Hall, 2002)
3 Telhami,
Shibley. “Israeli Foreign Policy: A Realist Ideal-Type or a Breed of
Its Own” 30-32. Israel
in Perspective: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom. Ed. Michael N.
Barnett. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996)
4 Telhami,
Shibley. “Israeli Foreign Policy: A Realist Ideal-Type or a Breed
of Its Own”, 30-32.
5 Kook,
Rebecca. “Between Uniqueness and Exclusion: The Politics of
Identity in Israel
in Comparative Perspective”. Israel in
Perspective: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom. Ed. Michael N.
Barnett. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996) 199-220.
6 Ibid,
36.
7 Ibid,
42.
8 Slater,
Jerome. “Netanyahu, A Palestinian
State, and Israeli
Security Reassessed”, 405-419. Israel. Ed.
Gregory S. Mahler. (Burlington:
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2000).
9 Benn,
Aluf, et al. Haaretz Online Newspaper. “Disengagement is on its
way”, December
8, 2004. http://www.haaretz.com.
10 Slater,
Jerome. ““Netanyahu, A Palestinian State,
and Israeli Security Reassessed”, 409.
11 Haaretz
Online Newspaper, “Four-stage disengagement plan”, May
28, 2004.
12 Benn,
Aluf, et al. Haaretz Online Newspaper. “Disengagement is on
its way”, December
8, 2004.
13
Telhami, Shibley. “Israeli Foreign Policy: A Realist Ideal-Type or
a Breed of Its Own”, 42.
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