Title: Sex Trafficking and the Re-creation of Europe
Abstract: Over the last decade, stories about women who are
trafficked into Europe and forced into sexual slavery have captured the
world's attention. Out of the histrionic narratives appearing in
newspapers, the policy responses of governments, and the writings of
academics, discourses of this phenomenon have formed, and not without
consequence for the actors involved. This presentation is part of a
larger project that explores how these discourses continue to affect
one of those actors, the European Union. It argues that current sex
trafficking discourses provide legitimacy for the EU by defining the
activity as a problem for Europeans, and thus demanding an actor
capable of providing a Europe-wide response. To understand how sex
trafficking becomes a problem for Europeans, the presentation will
consider the parallel stories of two subjects who play privileged roles
in
the process of European identity formation: Ukraine and migrant
Ukrainian sex workers. Both will be discussed as liminal figures -
existing simultaneously within and outside of the idea of Europe -
whose over-representation in the sex trafficking discourse serves a
useful function. Such an approach reveals both the importance of
liminality in collective identity formation and the connections that
exist between women's bodies and state bodies within the sex
trafficking debate.
Title: Parallel Leaders: Party Leader and Committee Chair
Leadership in the U.S. House from 1945-199
Abstract: My dissertation research is a longitudinal study that
compares and contrasts party leaders and committee chairs in the U.S.
Congress in the post-World War II era. My central hypothesis is that
party leaders and committee chairs should not be studied as separate
leadership positions targeting different goals, but they should be
examined together as "parallel leaders" who have similar objectives and
similar methods of meeting those objectives. Specifically, I squarely
take on the question of whether the power exercised by committee chairs
and party leaders is different, and if so, why. I examine the "actions"
that leaders perform in their leadership positions utilizing David R.
Mayhew's research in "America's Congress". To date, scholars have
focused on the relative independence of committee chairs in the
legislative process. My findings underscore that the policy positions
and legislative leadership of committee chairs and party leaders do not
differ as much as previously thought. This research clears a new path
for scholars of the legislative process, for as much as scholars have
accentuated the import of the era of "committee government," committee
chairs and party leaders worked far more in concert towards common
party goals than scholars have heretofore noted.
Title: Political Cleavages and Party System Stability: A
Survey of Postcommunist Eastern Europe
Abstract: Why do party systems in some new democracies stabilize
quickly while others remain in an extended period of flux? In
postcommunist Europe, this question presents itself with particular
urgency, and not just to scholars of party systems. Large flows of
newly established parties into parliament, and even government,
undermine the capacity of new democracies to support programmatic party
competition, an ideal in which public policies reflect the choices of
voters through the agency of programmatically defined political
parties. Illustrating the dangers of constant party system flux,
coalitions of outsiders and illiberal populists whose party
organizations did not even exist in the 1990s have, in recent years,
come to power in Poland, Slovakia, and Latvia -- to name some of the
more extreme cases. Building on existing literature about the nature of
party competition in multidimensional policy spaces, this paper tests
the hypothesis that the number and character of party cleavages in a
particular system influences its stability. The empirical analysis
makes use of a recent dataset created by Benoit and Laver (2006)
containing data on the placement of parties along a variety of issue
dimensions.
Title: Delegated Power: The Role of Discretionary
Experimenters and the Implementation Process
Abstract: Understanding bureaucratic behavior during the policy
implementation process requires social scientists to identify the
group of implementers who inevitably make decisions. These
implementers are entrusted with the power to bring a program to
fruition after it is approved by the legislature or an executive.
In this study I focus on what scholars have labeled "discretionary
experimenters."
These actors can be found at the cabinet, agency, and local levels of
government. Although these discretionary experimenters come from a
variety of
backgrounds and education levels, they are entrusted with broad
decision making authority. When a discretionary experimenter is
developing a program, what variables does he assume will lead to
successful policy implementation? What expectations for
successful implementation does he take with him into the process?
This study addresses these questions by identifying a group of
discretionary experimenters who implement policy at the state
level. I then conduct a simultaneous interview and survey meant
to test common variables associated with prevailing theories.
Title: Constructing a Professional Congress: The Development
of the American State, 1783-1851.
Abstract: The physical creation of a capital city containing a
stand alone building for Congress helped sustain and enhance the
nascent American state. The design and continual expansion of the
Capitol Building throughout the first half of the 19th century helped
the rapid expansion of the American state prior to the Civil War.
Without a stable physical environment in which to work, the Congress
would not have been capable of sustaining the output required to
develop the American state. Thus, American political development itself
is intricately bound together with the establishment of a physical
"Congressional Work Environment."
In this paper, I explore the Congressional Work Environment from both
organizational and individual level perspectives. I explore two sets of
primary documents for insights into the congressional institution circa
1850. Through triangulating the organizational and individual
perspectives, I identify three organizational and seven individual
Congressional Work Spaces within the broader Congressional Work
Environment.
Title: Rush to Judgment? Determinants of Public Prejudgments
About Muslims Accused of Terrorist Crimes
Abstract: In the wake of 9/11, many scholars and activists argued
that widespread animus against Arabs and Muslims prevented fair trials
for suspects charged with terrorist crimes. In particular, it was
argued, widespread stereotyping and hostility to Arabs and Muslims
undermined the cornerstones of the jury system, the assumption that
jurors would begin a trial of such defendants with an open mind and a
commitment to the innocence of defendants. Using the case of Sami
Al-Arian, a Palestinian accused of providing financial support to
terrorists abroad, we test these arguments with data from surveys
administered to potential jurors in five venues across Florida and the
southeastern United States. Our study differs from previous research by
(1) comparing the impact of ethnic prejudice against other factors
known to induce both prejudgment and partiality and (2)treating
prejudgment and partiality as separate domains subject to the influence
of prejudice rather than assuming their equivalence.
Title: Rethinking the Economic Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy: Useful Lessons From the Qualitative Canon on Democratization
Abstract: In this essay I assert that the central foundations of a
recent and much-praised book are largely undercut by the very cases the
authors claim support them best. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy has won critical acclaim since its publication in 2006, with
a glowing review in Science and the APSA's Woodrow Wilson and William
Riker Prizes as well as the Best Book in Economics and Finance from the
American Association of Publishers. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson
build a unified theory of political regime emergence based on two
fundamental statements: that economic inequality levels drive class
relations between elites and non-elites, and that only democratic
institutions can provide a credible commitment by elites to maintain
redistributive policies to the masses. They use the cases of Argentina,
Britain, Singapore, and South Africa to illustrate the argument. Using
both historical narrative analysis of their cases and brief comparisons
of subsets of the four countries, I demonstrate two things. First,
inequality appears to have almost nothing to do with democratization.
Second, dictatorships do as good a job at credibly committing to
redistribution as democracies. These two simple observations call much
of the claimed theoretical scope of Economic Origins into question and
remind us of some fairly simple but time-tested lessons of comparative
inquiry.
Title: Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places: E-Voting
in the United States
Abstract: Following the "Florida fiasco" presidential election of
2000, virtually all states moved rapidly to revamp their electoral
systems. Grasping at straws and rushing to judgment, they quickly
adopted a variety of e-voting technological panaceas designed to
prevent another debacle. But as it presently stands, e-voting causes
more problems than it solves. Indeed, in the end, e-voting as currently
practiced seriously undermines American democracy. To spell out this
argument, the paper will proceed by addressing the following questions: What was the political impetus for adopting e-voting in the United
States? Who were the political winners and losers in the switch to e-voting? What forms does e-voting take in the United States, and what
problems do they cause? What are the consequences of using e-voting technology in the
United States, what dangers do they pose, and what solutions exist, if
any, to them?
Title: What makes a president quack? Understanding Lame-Duck
Status
Abstract:
While both academic scholars and the media have used the term "lame duck" to
describe a President, there is little consensus over its meaning or impact on
presidential politics. This paper will explain when and why Presidents are
referred to as "lame ducks" and discuss the implications of the term. Tracing the
term to the 1880s, the analysis underscores that the term has taken on multiple meanings
that have shifted over time. The press and politicians began to use the term
in a negative light in 1946 during debates over whether Truman, or any
second-term President, could legitimately hold office. Within this meaning,
Presidents are seen as weak and lacking in what Paul C. Light terms "political capital."
No systematic analysis has been undertaken to verify how, or if, lame duck Presidents
differ in the resources considered vital to them, such as public approval generally
and amongst government elites and the media, or how that in turn affects agenda
success, party support in Congress, decision-making processes, and electoral
success for their party in Congress.
Using as a starting point Paul Light's definition of "political capital," the
author uses content analysis to develop a typology of lame duck Presidents that
analyzes the frequency of uses of the term by The New York Times and
The Washington Post and identifies the issues or behaviors used to label
the President as a lame duck. The analysis focuses on the three most recent Presidents
to serve two terms, George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Ronald Reagan. The results of
the analysis accent that media are much more prone to ascribe lame duck status to
incumbent Presidents when they are suffering dwindling composite scores on
political capital and when they are subject to scandals or congressional investigation.
The analysis concludes that however damaging lame duck status may be to incumbent
Presidents, it is not wholesale a bane on their policymaking ability. The author
provides evidence that because such Presidents are freed from the shackles of
worrying about reelection or approval ratings, they may use a focus on foreign policy
or unilateral powers to engage in substantial policy change.